State v. Russo Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 38404 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-12-2012
State v. Russo Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38404
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Russo Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38404" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4407.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4407
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID I\HO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 













BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE GREGORY M. CULET 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................... 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
I. Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
Court's Determination That Searching Him And 
Seizing His Cell Phone Did Not Violate Russo's 
Rights Against Unreasonable Search And Seizure .................... 5 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 7 
C. Russo Has Failed To Show That Searching 
His Pockets And Taking His Cell Phone Exceeded 
The Scope Of The Search Warrant ................................. 8 
II. Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District 
Court's Evidentiary Ruling On Prior Bad Act Evidence ............. 14 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 14 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 15 
C. Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The 
Admission Of Evidence That He Possessed 
Depictions Of Rape And Admitted Having 
Fantasies Of Committing Rape ...................................... 15 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE ......................................................................... 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) .......................................................... 11 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981 ) ......................................................... 9 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) .................................................................. 12 
People v. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d 463 (III. App. 4th Dist. 2010) .............................. 17, 19 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) ......................................................... 11 
State v. Beals, 410 SO.2d 745 (La. 1982) ............................................................. 8 
State v. Brown, 710 S.E.2d 265 (N.C. App. 2011) ....................................... 17, 18 
State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96,57 P.3d 807 (Ct. App. 2002) ...................... 12 
State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 194 P.3d 550 (Ct. App. 2008) ..................... 11 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 (2007) ............................. 19 
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 978 P.2d 227 (1999) ......................................... 19 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) ............................................. 7 
State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832,186 P.3d 688 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 12 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007) ........................................... 15 
State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3, 674 P.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1983) ................................ 9 
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 11 
State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146,254 P.3d 47 (Ct. App. 2011) ..................... 15, 16 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185 (2009) ........................................... 16 
State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410,3 P.3d 535 (Ct. App. 2000) ......................... 15 
State v. Kremer, 144 Idaho 286, 160 P.3d 443 (Ct. App. 2007) ......................... 20 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,962 P.2d 1026 (1998) ..................................... 15 
ii 
State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296,47 P.3d 1266 (Ct. App. 2002) ....................... 9,10 
State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818,215 P.3d 538 
(Ct. App. 2009) .............................................................................. 16, 17,18,20 
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 988 P.2d 689 (1999) ..................................... 11 
State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985, 188 P.3d 927 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................ 8 
State v. Whitaker, _Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2012 WL 182115 
(Idaho App., 2012) .......................................................................................... 16 
State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 534 P.2d 771 (1975) ............................................. 8 
Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,36 P.3d 1278 (2001) ......................................... 12 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) ................................................ 11 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) ................................................. 8 
RULES 
I.C.R. 52 ............................................................................................................. 19 
I.R.E. 404(b) ............................................................................................. 2,15,20 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Rowe Russo challenges his convictions for rape, kidnapping and 
burglary. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
J.W. woke up to find Russo, wearing a mask, in her bedroom. (Trial Tr., 
vol. I, p. 208, L. 18 - p. 210, L. 2.1) Russo put a pillow over J.W.'s face and a 
knife to her neck. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 3-7.) After securing J.W.'s promise 
to not scream, Russo pulled off her sweats and used the knife to cut off her top. 
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 8-17.) Russo then undid his own pants and put on a 
condom. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, Ls. 17-18.) Russo put J.W.'s thighs up and 
penetrated her vagina with his penis. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 210, L. 18 - p. 211, L. 
11.) Russo then straddled her chest, instructed J.W. to open her mouth, and put 
his penis in her mouth. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 211, L. 23 - p. 212, L. 14.) Russo 
moved J.W. to the edge of the bed and again raped her vaginally. (Trial Tr., vol. 
I, p. 213, L. 6 - p. 214, L. 6.) 
During the second vaginal penetration, J.W., although still having her face 
covered by the pillow, heard Russo open his cell phone, could see its light come 
on, and could hear Russo taking pictures. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 214, Ls. 7-15.) 
Russo then pulled her hair, slapped her, rolled her over to her hands and knees, 
1 The trial transcript is in three volumes: "Vol. I" contains trial proceedings on 
August 2 and 3, 2010 and a hearing from April 22, 2010, "Vol. II" contains trial 
proceedings on August 4, 2010, and "Vol. III" contains trial proceedings on 
August 5, 2010. All other citations to transcripts in this brief will be by date. 
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and penetrated her vagina a third time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 214, L. 16 - p. 215, L. 
7.) J.W. again heard him take a picture. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, Ls. 7-8.) 
Russo next had J.W. get off the bed and get on her knees on the floor. 
(Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, Ls. 18-22.) Keeping her eyes covered with his hand, 
Russo penetrated her mouth with his penis a second time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 
215, Ls. 22-25.) Russo then had the victim get her own lubricant from her 
bathroom at knife point and, using the lubricant, penetrated her vagina with his 
penis a fourth time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 215, L. 25 - p. 217, L. 2.) Russo then 
penetrated her anus with his penis. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 217, Ls. 2-3.) 
After that Russo got up on top of the bed with the victim, penetrated her 
vagina again, but this time "harder, so it kind of hurt." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 218, L. 
23 - p. 219, L. 2.) He told her, "This is for two-and-a-half years ago. You 
wouldn't give me the time of day." (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 219, Ls. 2-4.) Russo then 
turned on the bedroom light, had the victim get on all fours, and penetrated her 
vagina for the fifth time. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 219, Ls. 10-14.) After Russo left her 
apartment J.W. called the police from a neighbor's, because Russo had disabled 
her phone. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 220, L. 1 - p. 221, L. 2.) 
A grand jury indicted Russo for rape, kidnapping and burglary. (R., vol. I, 
pp. 10-12; vol. II, pp. 259-64.) Prior to trial, the prosecution moved for admission 
under I.R.E. 404(b) of evidence of prior bad acts including other rapes and 
possession of rape fantasy pornography to show identity, motive, modus 
operandi, intent, and plan, and to give context to why police immediately 
suspected Russo of being the rapist. (R., vol. I, pp. 44-72, 85-88.) Russo 
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objected. (R., vol. I, pp. 81-84.) The district court excluded most of the 
evidence, but did allow some evidence regarding Russo's statements about his 
own sexual fantasies made in a police interview and his possession of 
pornography depicting rapes. (R., vol. II, pp. 175-76,243; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 62, L. 8 
- p. 79, L. 17.) 
Russo moved to suppress "aI/ evidence obtained during a warrantless 
search of his person," among other evidence. (R., vol. I, pp. 73-80.) The state 
objected. (R., vol. I, pp. 100-59.) The district court denied this motion. (R., vol. 
II, p.166; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 52, L.13-p.103, L. 7.) 
The matter proceeded to trial where Russo was convicted as charged. 
(R., vol. III, pp. 367-70; Trial Tr., vol. III, p. 5, L. 5 - p. 6, L. 11.) The district court 
imposed concurrent sentences of fixed life, life with 40 years fixed and 10 years 
fixed, for rape, kidnapping and burglary, respectively. (R., pp. 413-414.) Russo 
timely appealed from the judgment. (R., vol. III, pp. 415, 418-21, 437-41.) 
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ISSUES 
Russo states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video 
discovered by police in an unconstitutional search of Mr. 
Russo's cell phone? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly 
prejudicial evidence concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual 
interests? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Russo failed to show any error in the district court's determination that 
searching him and seizing his cell phone did not violate his rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure? 
2. Has Russo failed to show error in the district court's ruling admitting 





Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
Searching Him And Seizing His Cell Phone Did Not Violate Russo's Rights 
Against Unreasonable Search And Seizure 
A. Introduction 
The district court found the following facts relevant to the suppression 
motion. Russo left the victim's apartment in Nampa at approximately 4:57 a.m., 
and the victim reported the crimes to the police shortly thereafter. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 
54, Ls. 2-9; p. 74, Ls. 2-5.) The victim reported "that during the course of this 
event that she believed she heard a camera from a cell phone going off ... as 
though the person raping her was taking photos of the rape." (1/27/10 Tr., p. 53, 
Ls. 1-15.) By 5:30 a.m. the police suspected Russo, primarily because he was 
the subject of investigation in relation to other rapes and sexual assaults. 
(1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, Ls. 2-25; p. 74, Ls. 5-8.) At about 5:47 a.m. the first police 
officer arrived outside Russo's apartment and determined that the engine of 
Russo's motorcycle was still hot from recent use. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, L. 23 - p. 
56, L. 10; p. 57, L. 15 - p. 58, L. 6; p. 74, Ls. 12-17.) Police shortly after that 
started surveillance of Russo's apartment. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 8-11.) Starting 
at around 6:00 officers saw Russo making several trips to a laundry room near 
his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including clothing 
matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist. 
(1/27/10 Tr., p. 72, L. 11 - p. 73, L. 1.) 
Police began the process of applying for a search warrant for Russo's 
apartment and motorcycle at about 10:00 a.m. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 59, Ls. 2-11; p. 
5 
74, Ls. 22-23.) Police saw Russo leave the apartment and walking around at 
about 11:00. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 74, Ls. 24-25.) At about 11:10 a.m. the search 
warrant was issued, and shortly thereafter the officers on the scene were 
instructed to detain Russo if he left the apartment again. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 66, Ls. 
20-21; p. 74, L. 25 - p. 75, L. 4.) 
One of the items to be seized as evidence of the rape, pursuant to the 
search warrant, was a cell phone. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 66, L. 22 - p. 67, L. 1.) About 
40 minutes later, at about 11 :50 a.m., Russo again left his apartment and was 
detained. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 19-23; p. 75, Ls. 4-5.) Officers frisked Russo 
and detected and confiscated a cell phone. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, Ls. 9-23; p. 75, 
Ls. 5-7.) They later determined that videos or photographs of the rape of J.W. 
were on the cell phone. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 23 - p. 71, L. 2.) Thereafter 
officers obtained a second, or amended, warrant specifically authorizing a search 
of the cell phone found on Russo's person (and two additional phones found in 
his apartment). (1/27/10 Tr., p. 71, L. 13 - p. 72, L. 10; p. 75, Ls. 7-10.) Russo 
was handcuffed and placed in a squad car immediately after the frisk and "at 
some point in the process, [Russo] was formally arrested for the crimes of rape, 
first-degree kidnapping and burglary" and taken to the police station for 
questioning. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 19; p. 75, Ls. 11-25.) 
The district court concluded that the initial search warrant authorized the 
search for and seizure of the cell phone on Russo's person and the retrieval of 
evidence such as photographs of the crimes on it. (1/27/10 Tr., p. 82, Ls. 7-25.) 
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Russo challenges the district court's ruling on appeal. He argues that, 
because he was not inside his residence at the time of the search that revealed 
his cell phone, he was not within the scope of the search warrant. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-16.) He further argues that the fact officers reasonably believed he 
had committed a violent felony using a knife that same morning did not justify any 
frisk for weapons when they detained him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20.) Finally, 
he argues that inevitable discovery did not justify excepting the evidence on the 
cell phone from the exclusionary rule. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-23.) Application 
of the correct legal standards shows Russo's argument to be without merit. The 
search of his person was, as found by the district court, within the scope of the 
search warrant. In addition, the search for the cell phone was justified as a 
search incident to arrest because officers had probable cause to arrest him at the 
time of his detention and search. Finally, because Russo's arrest and search 
were inevitable after execution of the search warrant even if the police had not 
seized his cell phone, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies such that 
suppression from any claimed illegality in the search that in fact occurred would 
be inappropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300,302, 160 P.3d 739,741 (2007). 
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C. Russo Has Failed To Show That Searching His Pockets And Taking His 
Cell Phone Exceeded The Scope Of The Search Warrant 
A search will exceed the scope of a search warrant "if officers search a 
location not specifically described or authorized." State v. Teal, 145 Idaho 985, 
989, 188 P.3d 927, 931 (Ct. App. 2008). This is so because both the Idaho and 
United States constitutions require the place to be searched to be described with 
particularity. kL The purpose of this requirement "is to safeguard the privacy of 
citizens by insuring against the search of premises where probable cause is 
lacking." State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 653, 534 P.2d 771, 773 (1975). 
In accomplishing the purpose of the particularity requirement search 
warrants should not be interpreted hyper-technically, but instead should be 
"viewed in a commonsense and realistic fashion." Teal, 145 Idaho at 989, 188 
P.3d at 931. "[P]ractical accuracy, rather than technical precision, controls the 
interpretation of warrants." kL (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 
108 (1965)). A warrant to search for items that could be on the person of the 
resident who is involved in the crime "authorizes the search of the resident as 
reasonably and necessarily within the scope of the warrant." State v. Beals, 410 
So.2d 745, 749 (La. 1982). 
The search warrant issued in this case authorized the officers to search 
for Russo's cell phone at the premises of his residence and on his motorcycle. 
(R., vol. I, pp. 133-34.) A cell phone is undoubtedly an item that Russo may have 
had on his person. Because the warrant was to search for evidence based on 
probable cause that Russo was a rapist and that evidence of his crimes would be 
8 
found on his cell phone, a search of his pockets was necessarily authorized by 
the search warrant. 
Russo argues that because he was detained and frisked by his mailbox 
outside of the residence itself he was no longer on the premises covered by the 
search warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16.) He merely assumes, and does 
not explain, how he was not on the premises allowed to be searched.2 
"When a defendant challenges a seizure, he has the burden of showing 
that the items seized were beyond the scope of the warrant." State v. Fowler, 
106 Idaho 3, 12, 674 P.2d 432, 441 (Ct. App. 1983). In State v. Pierce, 137 
Idaho 296,47 P.3d 1266 (Ct. App. 2002), Pierce was detained on a driveway 10 
to 15 feet from the home to be searched. ~ at 297-98, 47 P.3d at 1267-68. 
There was no evidence that Peirce was a resident of the home, that he had 
recently entered or left the home, or that he was involved in the criminal activity 
therein. ~ at 298, 47 P.3d at 1268. The Court noted the general rule that a 
search warrant "implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." ~ (emphasis 
2 For his argument Russo relies exclusively on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692 (1981), as authority for the proposition that the search here exceeded the 
scope of the search warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) In Summers, 
however, the Court concluded "there is no need to reach the question whether a 
search warrant for premises includes the right to search persons found there" 
because the search was justified as a search incident to arrest, and was careful 
to distinguish between the search and the seizure of Summers. Summers, 452 
U.S. at 695 and nA. The Court did not address the scope of the premises to be 
searched in that opinion other than to note that Summers was not within the 
premises subject to search when he was seized. ~ at 694. Thus, there is no 
analysis of why Summers' location outside the home placed him "outside the 
premises described in the warrant." ~ 
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added). Because Pierce was on the premises covered by the search warrant he 
was properly subject to at least a limited detention to ascertain his connection to 
the premises and his potential threat to officers executing the search warrant. kL 
at 298-301,47 P.3d at 1268-71. 
In the present case the warrant authorized a search of the premises of 
Russo's residence for Russo's cell phone, providing a specific address and 
mentioning that the residence was part of a four-plex. (R., vol. I, pp. 133-34.) 
The warrant application also established probable cause that Russo was the 
rapist. (R., vol. I, pp. 123-32; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 93, Ls. 4-7 ("more than substantial 
evidence" to show probable cause); p. 100, Ls. 1-13.) The evidence further 
established that Russo was detained somewhere between his front door and his 
mailbox. (R., vol. I, pp. 139, 142.) The facts here are virtually indistinguishable 
from those in Pierce, in which the suspect was found to have been on the 
premises covered by the search warrant while standing on a driveway about 10 
to 15 feet from the house to be searched. Russo presented no evidence 
whatsoever that he was not on the premises subject to search pursuant to the 
warrant when he was detained. 
Even if he had presented evidence demonstrating that the officers 
exceeded the scope of the search warrant when they searched his pockets and 
discovered the cell phone, such search was justified as a search incident to 
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arrest.3 A search incident to arrest is a well-settled exception to the warrant 
requirement. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The purpose of the 
search incident to arrest is to remove weapons from the arrestee's control, 
discover items that if left in the arrestee's control might facilitate an escape effort, 
and seize evidence of crime. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228-29 
(1973). It is well established that a search incident to arrest is proper even if the 
search precedes a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect 
exists at the time of the search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); 
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999); State v. 
Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351, 194 P.3d 550, 555 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Because Russo does not challenge the search warrant on appeal, it is 
undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and searched 
him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several 
rapes and that evidence in his possession, including a cell phone, would contain 
evidence of those rapes. It is also undisputed that Russo was 
contemporaneously detained, searched, handcuffed, put in a squad car, and 
transported to the police station. (See 1/27/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 19; p. 75, Ls. 11-25.) 
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Russo at the time of his 
detention and search, and probable cause to believe the phone contained 
3 The district court mentioned the search incident to arrest warrant exception in 
relation to whether the officers could search the cell phone once they had taken it 
pursuant to the warrant, but ruled on this issue on a different basis. (1/27/10 Tr., 
p. 81, L. 22 - p. 82, L. 25.) 
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evidence of a crime, the search of Russo and the seizure and search of the 
phone were proper incident to arrest. 
Finally, even if the search had not been authorized by the search warrant 
and also if the search had not been a proper search incident to arrest, there 
would have been no ground for suppression because the phone was subject to 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. The inevitable discovery doctrine is an 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 496, 36 P.3d 
1278,1284 (2001); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832,839,186 P.3d 688, 695 (Ct. 
App. 2008); State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102,57 P.3d 807, 812-813 
(Ct. App. 2002). Under the inevitable discovery doctrine the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to evidence found by improper methods if the preponderance of 
the evidence establishes that the evidence inevitably would have been found by 
lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at 
497 -98, 36 P .3d at 1285-86. The underlying rationale of this rule is that 
suppression should leave the prosecution in the same position it would have 
been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; 
see also Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 813. 
Here the evidence establishes that Russo's arrest and search, leading to 
police obtaining the phone, were inevitable. That evidence includes, but is not 
limited to, that Russo was already a suspect in a string of sexual assaults in 
various places in the Treasure Valley area (R., vol. I, pp. 125-31; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 
55, Ls. 2-25; p. 74, Ls. 5-8); Russo had been previously convicted of rape in 
Washington (R., vol. I, pp. 130-31); the rape of J.W., the other sexual assaults in 
12 
Idaho, and the rape in Washington all bore significant similarities (R., vol. I, pp. 
130-31); Russo had driven his motorcycle a considerable distance before 5:47 
a.m. the morning of the rape (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32); the time frame and distance 
between the rape in Caldwell and the arrival of officers at Russo's Meridian 
apartment was consistent with Russo having ridden his motorcycle from the rape 
scene to his home (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 55, L. 23 - p. 56, L. 10; 
p. 57, L. 15 - p. 58, L. 6; p. 74, Ls. 12-17); Russo was at about that time 
laundering clothes that matched the description of clothes worn by the rapist (R., 
vol. I, pp. 153-54; 1/27/10 Tr., p. 72, L. 11 - p. 73, L. 1); and latex gloves similar 
to those used by the rapist were found in the saddlebags of Russo's motorcycle 
(R., vol. I, p. 135). Even had the police not seized the cell phone in Russo's 
pocket at the time of his detention, his arrest and search incident thereto were 
inevitable. 
Russo has failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress the 
cell phone and its contents as evidence. He has first failed to show that the 
search and seizure of the cell phone were beyond the scope of the search 
warrant. Second, the search was proper as incident to Russo's arrest. Finally, 
even if the search had not been proper, the cell phone would have been 
inevitably discovered based on Russo's arrest once the search pursuant to the 
warrant was completed, and therefore the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. 
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II. 
Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Evidentiary Ruling On 
Prior Bad Act Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The state moved to allow introduction of evidence: (1) that Russo had 
committed other rapes; (2) that the other rapes, like the one charged, included 
"the inability to maintain an erection, the use of gloves, the taking of the victim's 
clothes, the use of weapons, and/or other distinguishing characteristics"; (3) that 
Russo admitted rape fantasies; and (4) that Russo possessed pornographic 
depictions of rape. (R., vol. I, pp. 44-72, 85-88.) Russo objected. (R., vol. I, pp. 
81-84.) The district court excluded most of the evidence. (R., vol. II, pp. 175-76, 
243; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 62, L. 8 - p. 79, L. 17.) It allowed, however, limited testimony 
of how Russo came to be a suspect in the charged rape, evidence of Russo's 
admissions of having rape fantasies, and evidence that Russo possessed rape-
themed pornography. (R., vol. II, p. 175; 3/18/10 Tr., p. 67, L. 14 - p. 70, L. 14; 
5/11/10 Tr., p. 24, L. 10 - p. 31, L. 3.) 
At the trial Corporal Tonna Marek and Officer Brice King testified that they 
suspected Russo shortly after the crime was reported and asked Ada County 
officers to go to Russo's home, but, pursuant to the trial court's ruling, did not 
state the basis for their suspicions. (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 287, L. 9 - p. 290, L. 16; p. 
489, L. 12 - p. 490, L. 6.) Admission of this evidence is not challenged on 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 23-29.) 
Corporal Angela Weekes testified that she interviewed Russo three times. 
(Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 19, Ls. 3-22; p. 38, L. 22 - p. 39, L. 5.) In one of the earlier 
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interviews Russo "described watching pornography that depicted rape." (Trial 
Tr., vol. II, p. 39, L. 24 - p. 41, L. 2.) He also described having violent rape 
fantasies. (Trial Tr., vol. II, p. 41, L. 3 - p. 42, L. 9.) The state also presented 
evidence that Russo possessed images depicting rapes (other than the one at 
issue). (Trial Tr., vol. I, p. 513, L. 13 - p. 519, L. 3; p. 522, L. 6 - p. 523, L. 11.) 
Russo does claim that the district court erred by admitting this evidence. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Application of the law to the district court's ruling 
shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than propensity is given free 
review while the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 
(2007). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. Konechny, 
134 Idaho 410, 414,3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. Russo Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Evidence That He 
Possessed Depictions Of Rape And Admitted Having Fantasies Of 
Committing Rape 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant's criminal propensity." State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 150, 254 P.3d 
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47, 51 (Ct. App. 2011). Evidence that implicates a defendant's character, but is 
also relevant to some permissible purpose such as those listed in the rule, is not 
excluded under Rule 404(b)'s relevancy prong. State v. Whitaker, _ Idaho 
_, _ P.3d _,2012 WL 182115 *1 (Idaho App., 2012). Only if the probative 
value of the challenged evidence is '''entirely dependent upon its tendency to 
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior'" will it be 
deemed irrelevant to a proper purpose under the Rule. Gomez 151 Idaho at 152, 
254 P.3d at 53 (emphasis original) (quoting State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,54,205 
P.3d 1185, 1190 (2009)). 
The evidence in this case is analogous to that held admissible in State v. 
Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 215 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2009). Rossignol was 
charged with lewd conduct for having sexual contact with his daughter. kl at 
820-21, 215 P.3d at 540-41. The trial court admitted evidence that Rossignol 
possessed child pornography and incest stories to prove intent, motive and plan. 
kl at 823, 215 P.3d at 543. Both were deemed properly admitted for those 
purposes. Jit at 823-25, 215 P.3d at 543-46. Although evidence of the 
pornography was admitted primarily to corroborate the victim's claim that 
Rossignol showed her pornography, the "incest stories were relevant to the intent 
element of the crimes Rossignol was charged with and to show Rossignol's 
motive and plan to engage in sexual acts with his daughter." Jit at 825, 215 P.3d 
at 546. Like the incest stories in Rossignol, the rape fantasies and supporting 
pornography were relevant to show Russo's intent, motive and plan. 
16 
Courts in other jurisdictions are in agreement. In State v. Brown, 710 
S.E.2d 265, 271 (N.C. App. 2011), the court held admissible evidence that the 
defendant was in possession of written depictions of incest in his trial for sexual 
abusing his daughter. The court distinguished cases generally holding that 
evidence of pornography was not relevant to a proper purpose and rejected the 
defense argument for a "broadly applicable rule with respect to the admissibility 
of [evidence of] pornography in a criminal case." kL at 166-69. Rather, the court 
compared that case to ones in which evidence of financial hardship or need was 
admissible to prove motive in crimes for which the defendant expected to benefit 
financially. kL at 270. The court then also found the evidence relevant to both 
general and specific intent. kL at 271-72. 
In People v. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d 463, 483-86 (III. App. 4th Dist. 2010), the 
court concluded that pornography "depicting primarily violence against women, 
bondage, sadism, and rape" was relevant to prove the identity of the perpetrator 
of violent sexual crimes against the victims. The pornography depicted the kinds 
of acts "emulated by the perpetrator in these cases." kL at 485-86. 
As in Rossignol, Brown and Pelo, the evidence in question in this case 
was admissible to prove intent and motive and, by extension, identity. Someone 
who views depictions of rape for entertainment and titillation and who fantasizes 
about committing rape is more likely to be a rapist than someone who finds those 
acts repulsive. Given the narrow scope of the evidence (limited to evidence 
concerning fantasies of sexual violence against women and pornography 
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depicting vaginal and oral rape) and how that evidence matched the facts of this 
case, the evidence established motive, intent, and identity. 
Russo argues it makes "little sense" to believe that evidence of 
possession of pornography depicting rape and fantasizing about sexual violence 
against women shows motive (the only possible relevance he sees in this case). 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27.) He argues that whoever committed the rape 
obviously had the motive of "sating his sexual urges" and therefore evidence that 
Russo had sexual urges he wished to sate by rape was irrelevant. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 27.) In the alternative, Russo argues that even if he "had a motive to 
rape generally, this motive in no way connects him particularly" to the charged 
rape. (Appellant's brief, p. 27.) It is Russo's argument, not the district court's 
ruling, that makes "little sense." 
In Rossignol evidence of written materials depicting as entertainment the 
very type of crime Rossignol was charged with committing was relevant to show 
his intent and motive. Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 825, 215 P.3d at 546. Idaho 
precedent rejects the argument made by Russo. 
In addition, in Brown, the court analogized evidence of possession of 
materials promoting incest to evidence of potential for financial gain to find the 
evidence relevant to motive. Brown, 710 S.E.2d at 270. "In each of these cases 
where the defendant desired money, evidence of that desire was relevant to 
show the defendant's motive in committing the acts underlying the offense." kL. 
In other words, a person who stands to gain financially from an act is more likely 
to do that act than someone who lacks that motive. Likewise, someone who 
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fantasizes and seeks entertainment from depictions of rape is more likely to gain 
(by "sating his sexual urges") by committing a rape than someone who at no time 
contemplates such an act and would gain no such satisfaction from it. Indeed, 
whoever committed the rape generally "emulated" the "acts and scenarios" 
contained in Russo's fantasies and entertainment. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d at 485-86. 
Such makes it more likely that the perpetrator was Russo. 
In this case the perpetrator of this rape went to rather extravagant lengths 
to hide his identity, including making sure the victim's eyes were covered during 
the whole ordeal and taking bedding and using a series of condoms to prevent 
leaving DNA evidence. The perpetrator also made sure to disable the victim's 
cell phone to give himself additional time to escape. He took photographs of the 
rape to be able to relive the event repeatedly. In short, whoever committed this 
rape put a lot of thought and effort into its planning and execution. That Russo 
spent time fantasizing about rape and seeking depictions of it for entertainment 
demonstrates that he is more likely the rapist.4 
Where, as here, evidence is relevant to matters other than propensity, it is 
admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 
230 (1999). Russo has failed to show any abuse of discretion in this weighing 
process. Although there is certainly some risk of unfair prejudice arising from the 
4 The state also asserts that the claimed error is necessarily harmless given the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, which included evidence that Russo had the 
video of the rape on his cell phone. I.C.R. 52; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 
463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007). 
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disputed evidence, here the probative value was such that it was not 
substantially outweighed by that danger. In this case the specific parallels 
between the fantasies and pornography and the act, all of which involved rape, 
are apparent. This both increases the probative value of the evidence and 
reduces the potential for unfair prejudice. Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 825, 215 P.3d 
at 545 (potential prejudice from evidence that Rossignol had materials depicting 
type of crime he was charged with did not substantially outweigh probative 
value); State v. Kremer, 144 Idaho 286,291-92, 160 P.3d 443,448-49 (Ct. App. 
2007) ("distinct similarities" between challenged evidence and crimes charged 
showed both relevance and lack of prejudice). Russo has failed to show error 
under either prong of the I.R.E. 404(b) standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012. 
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